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v. State, 165 Md. 155, 167 At. 6o (I933), and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has declared that it has no power to correct a verdict.
Smith v. State, lO9 Tex. Cr. App. 667, 6 S.W. (2d) 762 (1928).
The only court which has considered the constitutionality of an
appellate court's modifying a verdict is the Wyoming Court in State v.
Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. I I I, 253 Pac. 15 (1927). The defendant claimed
that instead of having to accept a modified verdict, he was constitution-
ally entitled to a new trial, the court answered this by saying that
among the facts found by the jury in returning a verdict of guilty of
murder were all the facts necessary to sustain a verdict of guilty of man-
slaughter. Though the defendant had a right to have a jury pass on the
facts once, he did not have the right to have another jury go over the
same facts. The court adopted the reasoning of State v. Fredrich, 4
Wash. 205, 29 Pac. 1055 (1892), that the difference between the
degrees of crime was a matter of law, and thus it was a proper matter
for the consideration of the appellate courts.
English appellate courts have exercised substantially the same power
as that granted the Ohio courts by the statute in question since the pass-
age of the Criminal Appeals Act in 1907. 7 Edw. 7, c. 23.
The attitude of the Wyoming court toward the question of the
constitutionality of the power to modify a verdict seems to be sound in
law and desirable in the light of the practical consideration of preventing
unnecessary retrials.
ROBERT B. GosLINE.
CONTRACTS
INFANTS' CONTRACTS-LIABILITY OF INFANT FOR DAMAGES
CAUSED BY BREACH OF CONTRACT TO LEASE.
A ten-months' lease for a summer cottage was executed by infant
lessees for a total sum of $135, of which $45 was paid down, the
remainder being payable later. They failed to make payment as promised
and notified the lessor that they were not of age and asked for the
return of their $45. This request was refused and the infant lessees
brought this action for the amount paid. Defendant counter-claimed
for the damage suffered by reason of her inability to rent her property.
Held: Counter-claim disallowed; plaintiffs are entitled to recover the
full amount'which they had paid in advance. Hewitt v. Klein, et al., 47
Ohio App. 40 Ohio L.R. 347, 355 (1933)-
It is well established law that an infant is bound by contracts for
necessaries. Whether the particular thing in dispute constitutes a neces-
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sary is often a difficult question, but once determined the rule is clear.
Moskow v. Marshall, 271 Mass. 302, 171 N.E. 477 (1930); Sims v.
Gunter, 2o Ala. 286, 78 So. 62 (1918); Irkansas Reo Motor Car
Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S.W. 975 (1924); J . G. Pierce Co.
v. Wallace, 251 Mass. 383, 146 N.E. 658 (1925); Wilkins v. Cock-
ran, 24 Ohio App. 408, 157 N.E. 494 (1926). While the leasing of
a house by an infant has been considered as a necessary, Gregory v. Lee,
64 Conn. 407, 30 Alt. 53, 27 L.R.A. 618 (1894), the renting of a
summer cottage, without a showing of special circumstances, could
hardly come within the scope of the term.
Contracts other than those for necessaries are voidable at the elec-
tion of the infant. There is a split of authority as to whether estoppel
is applicable to infants making fraudulent representations as to their
age. The weight of authority hold that fraudulent representations as to
age, in cases based on contract, will not raise an estoppel against an
infant. Sims v. Everhard, 102 U.S. 300, 26 L.Ed. 87 (188o); Tobin
v. Spann, 85 Ark. 556, 109 S.W. 534, 16 L.N.S. 672 (1908);
Arkansas Reo Motor Car Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S.W. 975
(1924); Raymond v. General Motorcycle Go., 230 Mass. 54, 119
N.E. 359, 6 A.L.R. 420 (1918). The reason underlying this rule is
the protection of the infant against himself. To apply an estoppel against
him is but an indirect way of enforcing the contract. Carolina, etc.,
Loan Association v. Black, 119 N.C. 323, 25 S.E. 975 (1896). There
is another line of authority which holds that estoppel is applicable to
infants who misrepresent their age, and this is especially true when the
infant is near majority and appears to a cautious person to be of age.
Commander v. Brazil, 88 Miss. 668, 41 So. 497 (19o6); Hood v.
Duren, 33 Ga. App. 203, 125 S.E. 787 (1924); La Rosa v. Nichols,
92 N.J. 375, 105 Ad. 2Ol (1918); Guidry v. Davis, 6 La. Ann. 90
(185).
The right of the adult to counterclaim for damages suffered by
virtue of deterioration caused by the use of the property when the infant
repudiates the contract and brings an action for the amount that has
been paid is a controverted question. The cases that are in point mainly
relate to the sale of personal property rather than the leasing of real
property. There is respectable authority holding that an infant upon
disaffirming the contract for the purchase of personal property, and upon
returning or tendering back the property, may recover what he paid,
without a deduction for the deterioration caused by the use of the
article. Summit duto Co. v. Jenkins, 20 Ohio App. 229, 153 N.E.
153, 24 o L.R. 392 (1925); Reynolds v. Garber Buick Co., 183 Mich.
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157, 149 N.W. 985, L.R.A. 19I 5C 362 (1914); McCarthy v. Hen-
derson, 138 Mass. 310 (1885).
A growing view is that adopted by the Federal Court and several
State Courts to the effect that the seller may retain an amount which
will compensate him for the depreciation in value of the article due to the
infant's use or abuse, which amount cannot exceed the sum paid in
advance by the infant. Mestetzko v. Elf Motor Co., I 19 Ohio St. 57 5 ,
165 N.E. 93 (1929); Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. IS, 71
L.Ed. 515, 5o A.L.R. 1181, 47 S. Ct. 277 (1927); Rich v. Butler,
16o N.Y. 578, 47 L.R.A. 303, 73 Am. St. Rep. 303, 55 N.E. 275
(1899); Garther v. Wallingford, ioi Or. 389, 200 P. 910 (1921).
It appears that the courts, in deciding cases relating to the counter-
claim of the seller, do not give him damages unless there is something
positive that has occurred such as deterioration caused by the use of the
article by the infant. Consequently, the lessor in the principal case was
rightly denied damages arising out of his inability to lease promptly to
another when the infant lessees took advantage of their privilege to
rescind.
NOAH J. KERN.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE-DESERTION AS GROSS NEGLECT OF
DUTY-EPILEPTIC SPOUSE.
The plaintiff filed her petition for divorce charging extreme cruelty.
The defendant cross-petitioned alleging gross neglect of duty. The
defendant was an epileptic and plaintiff had become quite proficient in
caring for him. Two months after she left him she began this action.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decree granting the defendant
the divorce holding that the desertion under the circumstances constitute
gross neglect of duty. Porter, Ex'r. v. Lerch, 129 Ohio St. 47, 193
N.E. 766 (1934).
Failure or neglect to perform marital duties is an element in gross
neglect. There is some authority that this alone is sufficient to constitute
the cause of action. Lee v. Lee, 132 Pac. 1070 (Okl., 1913). The
court there held that a substantial failure of a husband to provide suit-
ably for his wife's support when he is able to do so is gross neglect of
duty. It is to be, noted that the husband's ability to provide was a cir-
cumstance. The query as to whether it is a substantial factor is answered
in Nail v. Nail, 2 Ohio Dec. (Rep.) 501 (i86i), where the court
